Introduction
Executive compensation is under scrutiny and there are calls for regulation and "codes of conduct" with respect to levels as well as forms of compensation. Although the level of compensation in Europe remains below that in the US, the level in most European countries have increased rapidly in the new millenium. According to Bång and Waldenström, (2009) the difference between Europe and the US can be explained to a large extent by the larger variable component of executive compensation in the US. The higher variability in the US seems to be associated with a risk-premium. This observation implies that levels and forms of compensation are not independent.
One common view in the current debate is that CEO compensation should be linked to "sustainable" profits that presumably are the result of skill and effort. Regulation seems to be emerging in many countries stating that the reward for improved performance should not be fully realized unless the improved performance is observed for a period of 3-5 years.
Increased compensation would be linked to performance surpassing some benchmark for some duration. The argument behind such proposals would be that improved performance is likely to be caused by other factors than executive skill and effort if it does not exceed a benchmark for a minimum duration. The other factors could be earnings management by the executives and some sort of luck.
There are a number of difficulties associated with proposals of the type discussed if they are to provide appropriate incentives for managers. The concern with earnings management can be partly resolved by linking compensation to less manageable variables and by improved accounting standards. The issue of luck is more complicated. One problem is to define a benchmark for performance representing a minimum level that would be achieved without particular skill and effort. A second problem is to determine when and how performance above (below) the benchmark should be rewarded (penalized) for being the result of skill and effort rather than luck. More fundamentally, what changes in performance are caused by luck or bad luck in an environment characterized by a variety of shocks? Even with the benefit of hindsight this question could be hard to answer.
The contracting literature indicates that optimal incentive contracts are achieved by means of some kind of benchmarking for "normal" performance and the linking of compensation to a performance measure reflecting skill and effort with as little noise as possible.
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Analyzing the impact of luck on CEO compensation Mullainathan (2000, 2001) define luck as performance beyond CEO's control. As examples, they consider performance effects of fluctuations in oil prices in the energy sector, the impact of exchange rates in traded goods sectors and changes in performance around year to year changes in mean industry performance. Garvey and Milbourn (2006) use a market index and an industry index as proxies for stock price performance based on luck. In all cases the empirical results indicate that compensation depends strongly on luck. Garvey and Milbourn also find that executives are rewarded (penalized) more for good luck than for bad luck and that this asymmetry can be linked to corporate governance variables.
Accepting the premise from the contracting literature that lucky performance should not be rewarded there is an additional difficulty associated with the measurement of performance outside the control of management. As pointed out by Gopalan, Milbourn and Song (2009) the effect on performance of external shocks beyond management's control can be influenced by management's strategic choices as well as operational decisions in response to external shocks. If so, the incentives of management to take advantage of lucky external events and to dampen the effects of unlucky external events would be removed if compensation is not related to performance effects of lucky circumstances.
The implication of this discussion is that the appropriate definition of lucky performance depends on the nature of shocks and the technological ability to adjust strategy and operations to shocks within a certain time frame. The adjustment of strategy and operations can take the form of investment in flexibility or real options in an environment characterized by high uncertainty about external shocks or adjustment may take the form of switching production and marketing efforts in response to anticipated and even current events.
A restaurant business may be able to respond very quickly to lucky events by adding tables while a capital intensive firm may need years to adjust production capacity.
Lack of sustainability of performance also not a good indication of luck in all industries. Macroeconomic fluctuations may be short lived or last several years. The performance of a firm that can respond rapidly to macroeconomic fluctuations depends on skill and effort even in the short run.
1 Milgrom and Roberts (1992) reviews the contracting literature on incentive effects of compensation schemes.
In this paper we focus on the macroeconomic environment as a major source of changes in performance beyond management's control. Macroeconomic fluctuations affect almost all aspects of corporate performance but they cannot be influenced by management.
However, as noted, the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on corporate performance can be influenced by management if macroeconomic conditions can be forecast and operations can be adjusted within the period it is possible to obtain macroeconomic forecast. For this reason we distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated macroeconomic conditions.
Depending on firm-specific conditions, performance beyond management control may be explained either by all macroeconomic fluctuations or only by unanticipated fluctuations. Oxelheim, Wihlborg and Zhang (2008) show that 60 percent of the increase in CEO compensation in Sweden during the period 2001-2007 can be explained by changes in macroeconomic factors represented by interest rates, exchange rate changes and inflation.
Changes in these variables are viewed as indicators of underlying macroeconomic events. The variation in CEO compensation from year to year is also dominated by macroeconomic developments. Unanticipated macroeconomic events play a less dominating role in explaining changes in CEO compensation in Sweden but they are far from unimportant. The impact of unanticipated macro-factors on Swedish CEOs' year to year changes in compensation range from and -4 percent to +10 percent during the period. These changes represent a large share of changes in bonus payments. There are also indications that the impact of macro-factors is asymmetric through their impact on performance in the sense that compensation is affected more strongly by positive developments than by negative developments.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the role of macroeconomic factors in CEO compensation in the US furing the period 1992-2008. As Figure 1 shows a very large share of executive compensation in the US is performance based. Cash compensation in the form of salary plus bonus constitutes 15-20 percent of total CEO compensation. In Sweden the proportions are reversed with 75-80 percent of the compensation in the form of salary plus bonus, and more than 50 percent as salary. We ask whether these differences in compensation structure are associated with different sensitivities to macroeconomic events.
After estimating elasticities of compensation to macroeconomic factors we ask how CEO compensation would have developed had macroeconomic influences on compensation been filtered out each year. We also distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations to see how CEO compensation had developed if only unanticipated macroeconomic influences were filtered out from compensation. Third, we ask whether there is an asymmetric impact on remuneration any particular year in the sense that 6 remuneration is particularly sensitive to favorable developments in variables affecting performance. The interest in asymmetry arises because it may be reflect "skimming" of shareholders in the words of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and because asymmetry affects incentives for risk management with respect to variables affecting compensation.
Compensation is typically not linked in a simple way to one well-defined performance measure. Macroeconomic effects on compensation can occur through a number of channels depending on what aspects of performance affect salaries, bonus and other forms of CEO compensation. Therefore, we focus on the decomposition of compensation into "intrinsic" and macroeconomic components rather than of any one performance measure.
Presumably, changes in compensation net of changes linked to macroeconomic factors represent compensation for changes in firms' "intrinsic" competitiveness. We control for industry factors as well.
In Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2003) the case of Electrolux was used to illustrate how changes in performance can be decomposed into one "intrinsic" component and one component caused by macroeconomic developments. A set of domestic and foreign macroeconomic price variables (exchange rates, interest rates, price levels) were used to filter out the macroeconomic component from total changes in performance from quarter to quarter.
One reason for using price variables is that they can be observed without a long lag.
Therefore, they can be used in practice to decompose very recent changes in performance and, thereby, to adjust compensation.
In this paper, macroeconomic price variables are also used as indicators of macroeconomic fluctuation. We focus on the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on changes in CEO compensation in US firms during the period 1992-2008. The data set for compensation in the form of salary, bonus, option awards and pension payments is described in Section 2. Relevant performance variables explaining compensation are identified in Section 3. The contribution of macroeconomic factors to compensation and performance measures is estimated in Section 4 using cross-section and panel analyses. In Section 5 we decompose compensation each year into an "intrinsic" component and a component caused by macroeconomic factors distinguishing between the total impact of the macro economy and the unanticipated impact. In section 6 we test whether remuneration is asymmetric in response to macroeconomic factors, in particular. The total compensation each year is divided into symmetric and asymmetric components. Concluding comments follow in Section 7. Turning to skewness to analyze asymmetry of compensation we use growth rates of compensation from year to year for individual firms. The test for skewness requires a sufficient number of observations for each firm. A sub-sample consisting of 620 firms with at least 15 observations is created. For skewness tests, the null hypothesis is that skewness equals zero (not skewed). For normality tests, the null hypothesis is that the series is normally distributed. The cutoff p-value that is used here is 0.05, i.e. if the p-value is less than 0.05, then we reject the null hypothesis of no skewness.
In Table 2 , we see that 45 percent of the firms' Cash Compensation (including bonus)
is (significantly) skewed, while 56 percent of the firms' TDC1 is skewed. 65 percent of the firms have skewed TDC2. This observation makes sense since TDC2 includes the value of options at the time of exercise. Consistent with this observation column 4 of Table 3 shows that TDC2 is more skewed than TDC1 in 59 percent of the 347 firms wherein both TDC1 and TDC2 are skewed. We return to an analysis of asymmetric effects of macroeconomic fluctuations and performance in Section 6. Table 3 describes micro (Sales, Q, age and tenure) and macro variables (interest rate, inflation and exchange rate changes) for the full period and year by year. Average CEO age is 56 year old and tenure at the firm averages about 7 years. Annual averages of sales revenue and Tobin's Q are also provided in Table 4 . Annual averages for the 1-year Treasury bond yield, the exchange rate and inflation rates are described in Table 5 . We return to criteria for choosing the specific micro and macro variables below.
In the following we analyze first what performance measures are most strongly linked to CEO compensation before turning to analysis of the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations.
Explaining compensation without macroeconomic factors
Early US studies of executive compensation across firms focused on the relation between CEO compensation and measures of firm performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Murphy, 1985 Murphy, , 1986 Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Abowd, 1990; Leonard, 1990) , while other studies analyzed whether CEOs are rewarded for performance relative to a market or industry benchmark (Antle and Smith, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005) . The US evidence indicates that benchmarking is not practiced much.
In order to first identify the most important firm-specific factors explaining CEOcompensation, the compensation data (TOTALCURR, TDC1 and TDC2) is matched with firm performance variables. The sample of firms is limited to 620 firms with a minimum of 15 years of observations.
The following regression is estimated using a random effects model. 4 The dependent variable (Compensation) will be defined as TOTALCURR, TDC1 and TDC2 since the sensitivities to these compensation measures cannot be expected to be the same.
We use the same firm performance measures to explain CEO compensation across the US sample of firms as those used by Oxelheim, Wihlborg and Zhang to explain CEO compensation in Swedish firms. 17 industry dummies and 14 time dummies are included in the random effects model. The firm's total sale is used as a proxy for firm size. A number of performance variables are tested in equation (1) to find which one(s) explains compensation the best.
Tobin's Q is adopted as the performance measure in our specifications.
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All the variables in the regressions in this study are in logarithms. Therefore, the regression coefficients are interpreted as "compensation-performance elasticities" rather than "compensation-performance sensitivities". One of the advantages of the elasticity approach is that it produces a better "fit" in terms of marginal effects. Another advantage is that the elasticity is relatively invariant to firm size while sensitivities vary monotonically with firm size (larger firms having smaller betas) (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Murphy 1999) .
Based on Table 6 , firm specific variables including sales revenue, CEO age, tenure and firm performance all contribute positively to executive compensation. The cash component of compensation is the least sensitive to firm sales and performance as expected.
Compensation including options awarded and exercised (TDC1 and TDC2) are more sensitive 4 The random effects model is compared to pooled linear regressions and the fixed effect model in the next section where macro variables are introduced. See footnote 7 below. to these firm level variables. TDC 2 is also considerably more sensitive to Tobin's Q than TDC 1 indicating that CEO's are able to exercise options at favorable Q's. CEO age and tenure both contribute positively to cash-and total compensation to similar degrees.
In comparison to the results for Sweden reported in Oxelheim, Wihlborg and Zhang (2008) the compensation-sales elasticity for cash compensation is similar in the two countries while the total compensation performance elasticities are substantially higher in the US than in Sweden.
The results in Table 6 also show that there are substantial industry differences as well as time differences. The time dummies for TDC 1 and TDC 2 in particular seem to be much larger after 2000 than before. Equation 1 was also tested in cross-section for each individual year. The results are not included here for reasons of space. The compensation elasticities with respect to sales and performance were quite stable over time for TDC 2 and to a lesser degree for TDC 1. The greatest variation over time was observed for cash compensation.
CEO-compensation and macroeconomic factors
In this section we turn to an analysis of the macroeconomic influences on CEO-compensation.
These influences can occur through the performance variables in equation (1) or through other variables influencing compensation. We investigate whether macroeconomic variables affect compensation independently of variation in Performance and Sales, and we analyze macroeconomic influences on Performance and Sales. The total macroeconomic influence on compensation to be analyzed in Section 5 is the sum of these effects.
Macroeconomic conditions can be identified using either quantity variables like GDP, GDP growth, investments and employment, or using price variables like interest rates, inflation, exchange rates and the stock market index. Although the former group of variables describes macroeconomic conditions, they are typically observed with a substantial lag. As Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2008) note, price variables are easily observable signals of underlying macroeconomic shocks and developments. A shock would have a certain effect on a group of price variables as well as on GDP, employment, etc. but only the former would be observable at the time a shock occurs. Therefore, these signals can be useful tools for a firm wishing to decompose compensation and performance into "intrinsic factors" and macroeconomic factors. Another advantage of using price variables like interest rates and exchange rates in the decomposition is that they adjust rapidly to both domestic and foreign conditions affecting a firm's performance. For these reason we prefer to use only price variables as proxies for macroeconomic conditions in the following. Specifically, we use exchange rates, interest rates, inflation and the market return in the stock market.
It is likely that each firm's performance is sensitive to its specific set of variables but here we employ one set to explain changes in compensation across firms and time. Thus, we obtain estimates for the macroeconomic impact on compensation for the average firm. We restrict the use of dummies to identification of industry effects on levels of compensation.
The first step in the analysis of macroeconomic influences on compensation is to determine effects of macroeconomic influences controlling for variation in the performance variable, Q, Sales and industry dummies. These variables will explain only a part of changes in compensation if corporate boards use varying criteria to determine compensation. The analysis is conducted for the three compensation variables TOTALCURR, TDC1 and TDC2.
The following model is estimated on the firm level as well as in a panel using the random effects model: 
The robustness of the random effects model is further tested by using two alternative specifications, i.e. pooled , the random effects model is rejected at 5% level of significance, but it cannot be rejected at 1% level of significance. In addition, in order to detect multicollinearity among all the factors, the variance inflation factors (VIF) are estimated by using the pooled regression. The average VIF is 2.67, and the individual VIF is within the range 1.36-4.74. Therefore, multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem in the final model.
All variables are defined in log levels. The macro variables are the US 1-year Treasury interest rate, the exchange rate (Euro/$) and the consumer price index (CPI). The stock market index has been removed from the equation. It does not add explanatory value to the interest rate. Since compensation may be affected to different degrees by anticipated and unanticipated levels and changes in the macro-variables, we distinguish between the anticipated levels of the interest rate and the exchange rate, and the unanticipated changes in these variables from the previous year.
The anticipated exchange rate level in period t is further divided into the level last period and the anticipated change from last year. Thereby, the exchange rate can influence compensation in three ways; the level from the previous period, the anticipated change from previous period and the unanticipated change.
We assume that compensation is potentially influenced by inflation rather than the price level after controlling for sales. This variable is expected to increase with the price level.
At a constant inflation rate we expect sales and compensation to increase at the rate of inflation. Macroeconomic fluctuations will be reflected in the difference between the actual inflation and the average inflation during the period. Furthermore, the impact of inflation may depend on whether it is anticipated or unanticipated.
All proxies for anticipated vs unanticipated changes in macro-variables are subject to uncertainty and potential criticism. Nevertheless, we make assumptions about expectations formation since incentive effects of compensation sensitivities to these components of macroeconomic fluctuations can be quite different and since one objective is to estimate how compensation would have developed over time if CEO-compensation had been made insensitive to total macroeconomic fluctuations and unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations, respectively.
The expected interest rate in the next period is assumed to be equal to the current interest rate. Thus, all interest rate changes from year to year are assumed to be unanticipated. The expected inflation over the next year is equal to the inflation last year. In other words, a change in the inflation rate from one year to another is considered unanticipated. Thus, Sales and Tobin's Q are significant in all the models in Table 7 . Coefficients are very similar to the coefficients in Table 6 except that the elasticity of TDC2 with respect to Tobin's Q has increased.
Looking at the Model 2 results for macroeconomic variables the conventional measure of total compensation awarded (TDC1) depends negatively on both anticipated and unanticipated interest rates, negatively on unanticipated inflation and negatively on all three exchange rate factors indicating that an appreciation of the dollar leads to a decline in compensation. The magnitude of several coefficients is large. For example, the coefficient of -7 for the unanticipated interest rate implies that a one percentage point increase in the interest rate leads to a 7 percent decline in compensation. The smallest effects of macro-variables are associated with anticipated inflation (zero) and unanticipated exchange rate changes (-0.150).
These effects are obtained when controlling for sales and performance in terms of Q. The zero effect of anticipated inflation implies therefore that there is no effect of anticipated inflation above what is accounted for in increased sales and market value in dollars.
The orders of magnitude of macroeconomic effects are similar to the results obtained for Swedish CEO compensation in Oxelheim, Wihlborg and Zhang (2008) .
The results for compensation including options exercised each period (TDC 2) are different in some respects. As noted above the performance (Q) sensitivity has increased relative to results without macro variables. Furthermore, the effects of unanticipated interest rates and inflation are insignificant. Thus, all unanticipated macroeconomic changes have relatively little effect on compensation actually paid out while anticipated effects are as strong as for TDC1. One interpretation of these results is that executives are able to protect themselves against unanticipated macroeconomic events by means of timing of exercising options.
We turn now to the impact of macroeconomic factors on the performance measures, Sales and Q, which systematically affect compensation. We regress these two performance variables on the set of macroeconomic and dummy variables used in Models 1 in Table 7 . In addition, Log (Tobin's Q) is an independent variable in the regression for log Sales and vice versa. Table 8 shows that Sales has a small but significant negative effect on Q when controlling for macroeconomic factors and Q has a small significant negative effect on Sales.
These results indicate that sales generally are higher than what value maximization would call for. As expected Tobin's Q does not affect Sales.
All the macroeconomic variables have a significant effect on both Q and Sales.
Anticipated and unanticipated interest rates have a negative impact on both variables while inflation has a positive impact. Anticipated and unanticipated appreciations of the dollar are associated with negative effects on Q and sales. Thus, the macroeconomic effects of interest rate increases and dollar appreciations on compensation are negative through the direct channels captured in Table 7 as well as the indirect channels captured in Table 8 . The effect of increased inflation on TDC1 is negative through the direct channel in Table 7 but positive through the impact on Q and Sales in Table 8 . The effect of anticipated inflation on TDC2 in Tables 7 and 8 reinforce each other, however.
In the next section the above estimates of macroeconomic influences on Sales, Qvalues, and on compensation at constant levels of Sales and Q will be used to decompose compensation changes during the period 1992-2008 into one component explained by macroeconomic factors and one component explained by "intrinsic" factors.
Filtering out macroeconomic influences on compensation
How would compensation have developed if the impact on compensation of macro-economic factors would have been filtered out? Table 9 shows the impact on the three measures of compensation of the total change in the macro variables for the period 1993-2007, while Table 10 displays the impact of unanticipated changes in macro variables.
In each of the tables 9 and10 column (1) shows the percent of salary plus bonus caused by macroeconomic variables each year at constant levels of Q and Sales. In table 9 the column shows the effects of total changes in macroeconomic variables while in table 10 the effects of unanticipated changes are presented. Columns (2) and (3) show the corresponding effects of macroeconomic variables on total compensation awarded (TDC1) and total compensation realized (TDC2). Columns (4) and (5) show the percent of changes in Q and Sales explained by the same variables. Column (6) presents the sum of the effects in columns (1), (4) and (5) using the coefficients in Table 8 as weights. Thus, column (6) shows the percent change in salary plus bonus each year explained by macroeconomic factors. Columns (7) and (8) shows the macroeconomic effects on compensation awarded (TDC1) and realized (TDC2), respectively.
The macroeconomic effects in Table 9 , columns (1)-(3) are calculated based on deviations from mean levels of the macro variables each year times the appropriate coefficients in Tables 7. The procedure for calculating macroeconomic effects on Q and Sales is the same, but the coefficients are obtained from Table 8 . The mean levels of unanticipated changes are zero. The effects of changes in the exchange rate do not include effects of the lagged level of the exchange rate. Table 10 are calculated the same way as in Table 9 with the difference that only unanticipated effects of macro variables and corresponding coefficients are included.
Macroeconomic effects of unanticipated changes in macro variables in
The total macroeconomic impact on compensation in Table 9 varies from year to year and differs among the compensation measures. The impact on cash compensation varies from a negative 16 percent to a positive 31 percent. The corresponding figures for TDC1 (TDC2) are negative 16 (15.5) percent to positive 30 (40) percent. On average for the whole period the macroeconomic impact is close to zero. Comparing macroeconomic effects on cash compensation in Column (6) with total compensation awarded (TDC1) in column (7) it can be observed that the time pattern is very different although the variation is similar. Comparing effects on awarded compensation (TDC1) and realized compensation (TDC2) in column (8) the time pattern is once again different.
The effects of unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations in Table 10 are large as well.
The largest negative effect on cash compensation in column (6) is -27.6 while the largest positive effect is +27.7. The corresponding figures for TDC1 (TDC2) are -21.6 (-13.6) and +26.4 (+38.7). Thus, it seems that realized compensation (TDC2) is subject to smaller extreme negative effects of unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations as well as larger extreme positive effects.
In comparison to the results for Sweden for the years 2001-2007 the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations are much larger in the USA. The range for macroeconomic effects on total compensation awarded ranged from -11 to +12 percent while the range for unanticipated macroeconomic effects in Sweden was from -4 percent to +11 percent. During the same period the range for unanticipated macroeconomic effects in the USA in Table 10 is from -21.6 to +26.4. The large difference between the two countries can be explained by the much higher variable share of compensation in the USA making it more sensitive to unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations in particular.
Asymmetric macroeconomic effects
As noted in Section 2 the distribution of compensation in a large share of US firms is asymmetric. The model including macroeconomic effects in equation 2 is therefore reestimated by including interaction terms capturing up or down periods. We define one dummy with the value of one in periods when Q is increasing. The hypothesis is that sensitivity of compensation to all variables is more positive or less negative in periods when there is an increase in Q.
Taking the formulations for cash compensation, TDC1(model 2) and TDC2 (model 2) in Table 7 as the starting point we interact the 0/1 dummy with Sales, Tobin's Q and all the macroeconomic variables in Table 11 . The coefficient for each variable in periods when Q is increasing is the coefficient for the variable itself plus the coefficient for the interactive term with the same variable.
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In the regression for cash compensation (Current compensation) in Table 11 the interactive term is significant and positive for unanticipated inflation but significant and negative for Sales and the unanticipated exchange rate change. For total awarded 7 An alternative way to test for asymmetry is to use one 0/1 dummy for each variable taking the value of one in periods when the particular variable has a positive effect on performance.
compensation (TDC1) the interactive term is significant and positive for unanticipated inflation but negative for the unanticipated interest rate. The interactive terms for the anticipated interest rate and the unanticipated exchange rate are positive and significant in the regression for realized compensation (TDC2) while the interactive term for sales is negative.
Since there are both positive and negative interactive coefficients we calculate the total effect of asymmetry on total compensation awarded (TDC 1) for each year in Table 12 .
The figure for each year is the predicted percentage difference between the macroeconomic effect on TDC 1 if Q were increasing and the macroeconomic effect if Q were decreasing.
The result for each particular year depends on what macroeconomic variable was changing that year. The table indicates that in most years the macroeconomic effects on compensation would be greater if Q was increasing than if Q were decreasing. This asymmetry would tend to reduce incentives for risk management with respect to macroeconomic risk.
Conclusions
The "optimal" CEO compensation contract in terms of sensitivity and asymmetry to macroeconomic factors from shareholders point of view depends on a number of firm-specific factors in addition to ability to forecast macroeconomic developments and risk-aversion of managers. Firms differ with respect to adjustability of structure, capacity and operations, and they differ in terms of their sensitivity to macroeconomic fluctuations. Thus, although macroeconomic fluctuations are beyond management's control their impact on performance may not be the result of luck alone. If management cannot do much to benefit from positive macroeconomic developments or to dampen the effects of negative developments, contract theory suggest that management should not be rewarded (penalized) for performance it cannot influence. This argument presumes that it does not lie in the shareholders interest to induce management to reduce exposure to macroeconomic fluctuations.
No matter how the optimal incentive contract looks there is little doubt that macroeconomic fluctuations have a powerful impact on CEOs' compensation in the US as well as in Sweden as shown in Oxelheim, Wihlborg and Zhang (2008) . The sensitivity of compensation seems larger in the US than in Sweden where the variable part of compensation is much lower than in the US (Fernandes et al., 2008) .
Analysis of the dependence of a particular firm's performance and CEO-compensation on macroeconomic conditions requires data for performance, compensation, and relevant macroeconomic data for a substantial period. The relevant macroeconomic factors and their impact may vary across firms. In this paper the analysis was restricted to macroeconomic influences on CEO compensation in a panel of 620 forms for the period 1993-2007 using the same set of macroeconomic factors for all firms. Using pooled data we identified the average impact of macroeconomic factors on cash compensation (salary plus bonus), total compensation awarded and total realized compensation taking into account exercised options.
Three channels of macroeconomic influences on compensation were identified.
Macroeconomic factors affect sales and Q-values, and they affect compensation through other variables that affect compensation in a less systematic way than sales and Q. The macroeconomic factors we identified as important for the aggregate performance and compensation in the firms were the exchange rate, the interest rate and the inflation rate.
These macroeconomic price variables can be viewed as signals of underlying macroeconomic
shocks. As such, they are easily observable and useful for decomposing performance and compensation into an "intrinsic" component and a macroeconomic component. The impact of unanticipated macroeconomic factors on US CEO compensation is almost as large as the impact of total macroeconomic factors although the time pattern is different. Furthermore, the most negative impact on realized compensation is smaller than the most negative impact on awarded compensation while the most positive impact on realized compensation is larger than the most positive impact awarded compensation.
and more skewed for realized compensation than for awarded compensation. We analyzed whether the impact of macroeconomic factors on awarded compensation is larger in periods when Q is increasing than when Q is decreasing. The results were ambiguous but analysis of the asymmetric impact each year indicated that in most periods macroeconomic effects on compensation are larger in years when Q is increasing.
It is a complicated task beyond the scope of this paper to analyze incentive effects of the observed sensitivity of both performance and compensation to macroeconomic fluctuations. Even if performance effects are considered the result of luck it seems that compensation in the form of options allow CEOs' to time the exercising of options to their advantage. If so, the incentive to manage uncertainty with respect to macroeconomic factors is reduced relative to a situation when both performance effects and compensation effects are the result of luck. Table 7 ( Models 2 for TDC1 and TDC2). In the column (6), (7) and (8), w q and w s are the coefficients for the variables Log (Tobin's Q), and Log (Sales) in Table 8 . This table reports the predicted unanticipated symmetric macro effects in different years as well as the whole period 1993-2007 using coefficients in Table 7 (Models 2 for TDC1 and TDC2). In the column (6), (7) and (8), w q and w s are the coefficients for the variables Log (Tobin's Q), and Log (Sales) in Table 8 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 20 
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